I. Introduction
Investment arbitration has emerged as the most effective means of resolving investor-State disputes. The popularity of arbitration for this purpose has not only led to a rapid increase in the caseload of arbitration institutions, but has brought with it an array of new issues. As a consequence, investment law is presently being challenged by interactions with other, noninvestment, obligations. These are raised by investors, States, and non-party actors alike. In addition to environmental and labour-related issues, references to human rights are appearing, yet they remain sparse and infrequent.
It is not impossible for treaties for the protection of investments, such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs), to provide for human rights, but this would be highly unusual. This suggests that the present role of human rights in the context of investment arbitration is peripheral at best. This contribution shall attempt to throw some light on the role of human rights in international investment arbitration, focusing more particularly on the issues relating to jurisdiction, the applicable law and invocation during proceedings. In its Articles 12 and 13, the US Model BIT does however address environmental and labour law.
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II. Jurisdiction over Human Rights Issues
The system of investment arbitration does not generally require the exhaustion of local remedies and places the investor and the State on an equal footing, thus supplanting diplomatic protection. This is somewhat of an anomaly in the larger context of international law. Established on a case-for-case basis, arbitral tribunals draw their jurisdiction to make binding rulings on a dispute solely from the consent of the parties. The tribunal's jurisdiction is consequently both based on and limited to that agreement. Hence, the mere allegation of a human rights violation would not suffice to confer jurisdiction on a tribunal.
To determine whether an investment tribunal is competent to decide on human rights issues, the clause establishing jurisdiction is decisive.
Thus, the formulation of the compromissory clause in the treaty or contract will reveal the breadth of the tribunal's jurisdiction. In many cases, it will be "restricted to 'investment disputes' … or to alleged violations of the substantive rights in the investment treaty." 4 In the case of NAFTA, Article 1116 effectively delimits NAFTA's applicability to alleged breaches of Section A, i.e. to breaches of NAFTA obligations. Similarly, Article 26 (1) and (2) of the ECT provides that only breaches of obligations contained in its Part III are arbitrable. These restrictions to disputes originating from the breach of a treaty obligation coupled with the fact that these treaties contain no substantive human rights standards suggest that arbitral tribunals will lack the competence to rule on human rights issues as far as the NAFTA and the ETC are concerned. However, certain human rights violations, such as those related to the protection of the investor's property, may at the same time constitute a breach a of particular treaty obligation and hence fall within the realm of the tribunal's competence, thus providing access to investment arbitration. The Tribunal's reasoning, based on the interpretation of the agreement's compromissory clause which limits jurisdiction to disputes "in respect of an approved enterprise", declared that an independent claim for violation of human rights fell beyond the scope of its
competence. Yet, while it may not be competent for an independent claim, human rights violations cannot per se be excluded from its jurisdiction. If and to the extent that the human rights violation affects the investment, it becomes a dispute "in respect of" the investment and is hence arbitrable.
III. Human Rights Law as Applicable Law
In considering the role of human rights in international investment arbitration, it does not suffice to establish the tribunal's jurisdiction over alleged violations of human rights, since the analysis and evaluation of the breaches will depend upon the applicable substantive standards.
It is not impossible that BITs or multilateral investment treaties contain human rights provisions. But this would be quite exceptional. 8 In the absence of specific human rights 6 At p. 188. The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976 do not envisage the application of international law, giving priority to the parties' agreement. In the event that such an agreement is lacking they state that "the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable." 16 This peculiarity may be explained by the fact that UNCITRAL is primarily an instrument for the settlement of commercial disputes between private actors and hence less prone to applying public international law.
IV. Corporate Social Responsibility
When considering whether and to what extent States are bound by human rights duties, it would be inconsistent to disregard obligations that might be incumbent upon the investor.
Foreign investment has not always harvested praise and concern about the role played by multinational enterprises in the protection of fundamental rights has grown. As a response to this, the concept of (international) corporate social responsibility has emerged, attempting to apply human rights responsibilities to investors.
Before attempting to substantiate the content of such obligations, it seems necessary to question whether legal persons such as corporations can be bearers of human rights responsibilities. After all, these are traditionally considered to pertain to the domain of In Azurix v. Argentina, an ICSID case concerning water and sewage systems, Argentina raised the issue of the compatibility of the BIT with human rights treaties that protect consumers' rights and argued that "a conflict between a BIT and human rights treaties must be resolved in favour of human rights because the consumers' public interest must prevail over the private interest of service provider." 36 The Tribunal found that the matter had not been fully argued and noted that it failed to understand the incompatibility in the specific case seeing that the services to consumers continued without interruption after the termination notice.
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In Siemens v. Argentina, Argentina again claimed that given the social and economic conditions of Argentina, recognizing the property rights asserted by Claimant would disregard human rights incorporated in the Constitution. 38 In response to Argentina's argument, the Tribunal held that the argument had not been developed and that "without the benefit of further elaboration and substantiation by the parties, it is not an argument that, prima facie, bears any relationship to the merits of this case." It is doubtful whether the right to a fair trial is designed to promote the case of an amicus curiae. It confers rights upon persons "whose rights and obligations in a suit at law are being determined by a court or tribunal" 46 and concerns the standing as a party to proceedings, rather than the possibility to submit documents and briefs as amicus curiae.
The standing as a party for those directly concerned, such as the inhabitants of Cochabamba, Bolivia, may be desirable, yet the consensual nature of the arbitration system and its limited jurisdiction would presumably prevent it.
In a second group of cases, the admissibility of amicus curiae submissions were considered not so much from the point of view of the petitioners' human right to a fair trail, but on substantive grounds. The human rights issues raised by the petitioners were understood to contribute to the special public interest of the arbitration and thus justified the admission of amicus curiae briefs. from each of the Petitioners." 47 The Tribunal noted that "the public interest in this arbitration arises from its subject matter" and argued that "the Chapter 11 arbitral process could benefit from being perceived as more open or transparent" so that "the Tribunal's willingness to receive amicus submissions might support the process in general and this arbitration in particular." 48 In the context of NAFTA arbitration, the competence of tribunals to admit amicus curiae On the basis of the reasoning provided by the tribunals, it appears that in permitting amicus curiae briefs, arbitral tribunals seem more moved by efforts to increase transparency and respond to public interest rather than by human rights considerations.
The revision of the ICSID Arbitration Rule 37(2) on 10 April 2006, removed all doubts over the tribunal's power to admit amicus curiae briefs. Rule 37(2) now provides:
After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person or entity that is not a party to the dispute (in this Rule called the "non-disputing party") to file a written submission with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute. …
D. By the Tribunal
The influence of human rights on investment arbitration is also demonstrated by the occasional willingness of tribunals to cite human rights documents as authority for their decisions. 
VI. Conclusion
In some respects, human rights law and investment law are very similar. Ben Hamida observes that certain substantive norms such as the prohibition of discrimination and the protection of property may be common to both investment and human rights law. 67 Moreover, both are fundamental to the process of the emancipation of the individual from the State. They both provide for proceedings between an individual and a State.
In the procedural context, investment law grants more rights to the individual. Many human rights treaties still do not foresee the possibility of individual complaints by private persons, let alone juridical persons. Equally, the requirement of the exhaustion of local remedies as a condition for the exercise of jurisdiction by the international body is rare in investment law.
The contrary applies to human rights law, where the necessity to exhaust local remedies is the rule.
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In some respects, human rights and investment law differ dramatically. The paradox of nationality as it exists in the investment context is alien to human rights law. In investment arbitration, nationality is crucial. Not only is the entire concept of BITs founded on the possession of a specific nationality, but to establish the tribunal's jurisdiction the investor must fulfil both positive and negative requirements: the investor must be a national of a State party to a particular investment instrument (be it ICSID or NAFTA). In addition, the differences. In investment law, the 'all or nothing' principle is applied. 70 This means that investors are entitled to full compensation in case of an expropriation and to nothing if a legitimate regulation is found to have occurred. By contrast, the ECHR has developed a more differentiated practice based on a proportionality test which includes the amount of compensation in its considerations. 71 Rather than using the proportionality text to decide whether an expropriation has occurred, it is used to decide "whether a suitable balancing of the State's interest to interfere and the property protection interest of the person hit by the interference has taken place." 72 Kriebaum suggests transferring elements from the ECHR's practice to investment law so as to integrate the level of compensation into the proportionality test to prevent the dissatisfying results of an 'all or nothing' approach. 73 The current trend seems to indicate that the role of human rights in investment arbitration will continue to increase. Whether the arbitral system is the best suited for dealing with breaches of human rights is a controversial issue. Lack of transparency and legitimacy are perhaps inevitable reproaches 74 and it remains to be seen whether these issues can be resolved.
